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RETHINKING CIviL RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE
JULIE GOLDSCHEID*
ABSTRACT
Advocacy seeking justice for survivors of domestic and sexual violence
historically has invoked civil rights law and rhetoric to advance legal remedies
and public policy reform. Although many have come to think of a civil rights
remedy as a private right of action against an individual, when we think about
civil rights and gender violence, we should be thinking more broadly. Neither the
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Morrison, nor its decision in Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, both of which rejected civil rights-based claims, precludes new
civil rights reform. Indeed, a civil rights frame has enduring potential to support
needed change by challenging structural inequalities that continue to inform and
drive gender violence.
This article considers potential civil rights remedies that would address
structural and systemic inequalities related to gender violence. It focuses on one
area of potential reform: law enforcement accountability. The article urges a shift
that views law enforcement accountability for gender violence on the same
continuum as other forms of law enforcement misconduct. Popular understand-
ings of police misconduct typically involve over-enforcement, while cases
involving gender violence typically involve under-enforcement. However both
categories involve misuse of authority and should be thought of in tandem. This
shift can reinvigorate existing strategies and can generate new approaches to
both law and policy. The article makes recommendations that would contribute to
a new generation of progressive reform that advances the principles of equality
and liberty for which civil rights long has stood.
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INTRODUCTION
"Civil rights" has been a powerful frame for spurring transformative reform on
a range of issues, including gender violence.' Civil rights litigation beginning in
the 1970's provoked significant policy reforms by challenging law enforcement's
failed responses to domestic violence calls.2 More recently, the civil rights
remedy enacted as part of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)3
captured the imagination of advocates and the general public alike.4 The civil
rights frame helped spur public conversations about the relationship between
1. This article uses the term "gender violence" to encompass acts such as domestic violence and
sexual assault, which are committed predominantly by men against women. See, e.g., CALLIE MARIE
RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BuREALU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PAReNER VIOLENCE,
1993-2001 (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv0l.pdf (concluding that
eighty-five percent of all victimizations by intimate partners in 2001 were against women); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMzAnON IN THE UNTED STArEs, STARSTICAL
TABLEs INDEx, at tbl. 2 (reporting that ninety-two percent of all sexual assaults in 2005 were committed
against women).
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), struck down as unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).
4. See infra Part I.C.
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gender violence and gender equality and held the potential to generate
transformative change.
Two widely critiqued United States Supreme Court decisions limited the reach
of those civil rights approaches. In United States v. Morrison, the Court struck
down as an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power the VAWA civil
rights remedy, which provided a private right of action against a perpetrator of
gender-motivated violence.6 Five years later, in Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the
Court rejected one of the civil rights theories grounded in the Constitution under
which law enforcement had been held accountable for failed responses to gender
violence calls.7 Notwithstanding the setbacks both of those decisions represent,
neither precludes advancement of new civil rights-based remedies for gender
violence. The notion that gender violence constitutes a civil rights violation
should not be abandoned or forgotten.
A civil rights frame has enduring potential to support much needed reform by
challenging structural inequalities that continue to inform and drive gender
violence. Multiple issues might be addressed. For example, legislation might
provide a private right of action modeled on the 1994 VAWA civil rights remedy
in a way that addresses the Morrison Court's concerns.8 Alternatively, law reform
might advance institutional accountability for gender violence-related discrimina-
tion,9 or might promote economic reforms that address structural roots of
abuse.'o For reasons described in Part II, this Article focuses on institutional
accountability.
5. See infra notes 73, and accompanying text.
6. 529 U.S. 598-74 (2000). For commentary critiquing the decision, see, e.g., Sally F Goldfarb, "No
Civilized System of Justice:" The Fate of the Violence Against Women Act, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 499
(2000); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV.
L. REv. 135 (2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000); Judith Resnik,
Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001); Lawrence G.
Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (2000).
7. 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (rejecting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging that law enforcement's failure to
take steps to investigate or respond to allegations of protective order violation violates procedural due
process). For commentary critiquing the decision, see, e.g., Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Human Rights at
Home: Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Violation, 40 HuM. RTs. L. REv. 19 (2008); Zanita Fenton,
State-Enabled Violence: The Story ofTown of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, in WOMEN AND THE LAW: STORES
379, 388 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011); G. Kristian Miccio, The Death of
the Fourteenth Amendment: Castle Rock and its Progeny, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 277 (2011).
The decision addressed Jessica Lenahan's procedural due process claims only, and did not address law
enforcement liability under other theories, such as those based on state-created danger, special
relationship, or equal protection. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weissman, Law, Social Movements, and the Political Economy of Domestic
Violence, 20 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2037606; Deborah Weissman, The Personal is Political-and Economic:
Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REv. 387 (2007).
2013] 45
46 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW
The idea that gender-based violence constitutes a civil rights violation may be
more compelling today than it has been in the past, given international human
rights law's growing recognition that gender-based violence violates human
rights." Structural inequalities, discrimination, and infringement of liberty
interests continue to animate the problems faced by domestic and sexual violence
survivors.' 2 Nevertheless, in the decade since the Morrison decision, advocates
in the United States have not coalesced to demand new or revived civil
rights-based enforcement for law enforcement responses to gender-based vio-
lence, either to seek a refashioned remedy against private perpetrators or to
ensure state accountability.' 3
This article considers potential civil rights remedies that would address
structural and systemic inequalities related to gender violence, and focuses on
one area of potential reform: law enforcement accountability. It urges a shift to a
perspective that views law enforcement accountability for gender violence on the
same continuum as other challenges to law enforcement misconduct. Popular
understandings of police misconduct typically involve over-enforcement, 4 while
cases involving gender violence typically involve under-enforcement. 5 How-
ever, both categories of cases involve misuse of authority and should be thought
of in tandem.16 This shift can reinvigorate existing strategies and can generate
new approaches to both law and policy.
Part I starts with an overview of civil rights-based reform to redress gender
violence. It recaps the dual focus of U.S.-based civil rights-based reforms: law
enforcement accountability and a remedy against private individuals. It traces the
11. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Caroline Bettinger-Lopez et al., VAWA Is Not Enough: Academics Speak Out About
VAWA, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORs (Feb. 27, 2012) http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2012/02/
academics-speak-about-vawa-reauthorization/, (applauding proposals to reauthorize VAWA while urging
Congress to do more to address economic and racial inequalities that make poor women, particularly
women of color, undocumented women, and Native American women, more vulnerable to intimate
violence).
13. Although both the Morrison and Castle Rock decisions provoked sharp critiques and galvanized
organized efforts, there has been no advocacy call for civil rights-based reform. See, e.g., Caroline
Bettinger-Lopez, Jessica Gonzales v. United States: An Emerging Model for Domestic Violence and
Human Rights Advocacy in the United States, 21 HARv. Hum. Rrs. J. 183, 191-92 (2008) (discussing
domestic violence advocacy community's response to Castle Rock decision). Although not a complete
reflection of advocacy efforts, it is notable that none of the reauthorizations of the Violence Against
Women Act subsequent to the Morrison decision have included renewed civil rights remedies. See, e.g.,
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-162
(Jan. 5, 2006); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012, H.R. 4970, 112th Cong. (2012).
14. See, e.g., Kami C. Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using Congressional
Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REv. 351, 360 (2011) (recognizing that
police misconduct often conjures images of use of excessive force, but should be conceived more broadly
to include, for example, racial profiling and corruption).
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1715 (2006) (arguing
that under-enforcement should be considered along with over-enforcement as symptoms of the weakness
of the United States' criminal justice system).
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overall trajectory of reform on both issues, including their culmination in
constrained Supreme Court decisions. The section contrasts the lack of advocacy
for corrective legislation in this context with legislative responses to other
restrictive Supreme Court decisions and posits reasons for the absence of a robust
advocacy-based reaction.
Part H argues for a revived civil rights approach. It draws on civil rights law's
historic utility in advancing institutional reform, and argues that ongoing
problems with law enforcement responses to gender violence warrant renewed
consideration. Part m reviews the status of federal caselaw holding law
enforcement accountable for responding to gender violence. It outlines the
arguments that remain available notwithstanding an increasingly narrowed
doctrinal framework and argues that those arguments can and should be more
widely used. It demonstrates that current doctrine is unnecessarily constrained
and out of step with emerging international norms.
Part IV considers approaches to law enforcement accountability for gender
violence that are not grounded in traditional civil rights litigation. It argues that
administrative remedies typically invoked in law enforcement misconduct cases
involving over-enforcement can complement traditional litigation-based rem-
edies. A shift to a civil rights lens also can galvanize community organizing and
activism. Part V considers the limitations of shifting focus to state accountability
as a matter of civil rights enforcement. The article concludes with suggestions for
future reform.
I. CIVIL RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE
A. OVERVIEW
Civil rights law and rhetoric has been, and is, a powerful frame for meaningful
reform." The term "civil rights" has its roots in the post-slavery movement to
ensure equality for African Americans." It typically is invoked to refer to
17. See, e.g., DENISE C. MORGAN ET AL., AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND
THE NEw STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2005) (critiquing U.S. Supreme Court decisions limiting reach
of civil rights laws); see also Testimony of Rea Carey, Exec. Dir., National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
Action Fund, to U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/release-materials/enda_1109_testimony.pdf (urging passage of
ENDA); About Us, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO RESTORE CIVIL RIGHTS, www.rollbackcampaign.org/aboutust
(campaign to ensure that courts protect and preserve equal justice, fairness and opportunity); see
generally Civil Rights, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/civil-rights (last visited
Oct. 1, 2012) (citing multiple civil rights advances of the administration).
18. For discussion of the trajectory of the civil rights movement, including attendant debates, for
example, over whether law reform should seek equality of opportunity or of result, and of strategic
lawyering choices, for example, over whether to prioritize ending segregation or advancing economic
equality, see, e.g., RISA L. GOLuBoFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL, RIGHTS (2007); MicHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW T CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004);
Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era before Brown, 115 YALE
L.J. 256 (2005).
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principles of equality and liberty protected by the constitution.9 The civil rights
framework is rooted in the concept that those who discriminate based on
impermissible biases and stereotypes violate legal and social norms, and that the
person discriminated against should be eligible for redress. 2 0 The notion of
"rights" has held expressive and symbolic value as part of social movements'
efforts to advance transformative change.2 ' It continues to be a potent frame for
change notwithstanding arguments that the United States' current approach to
civil rights laws has outlived its usefulness,2 2 and recent United States Supreme
Court decisions narrowing the availability of remedies under a variety of civil
rights protections.23 I invoke the term in the context of gender violence law
reform to reference legal and other strategies that ground substantive and
rhetorical approaches in terms of equality and liberty.24
Historically, civil rights strategies to address gender violence in the United
States have taken two primary forms: suits seeking to hold institutions, primarily
law enforcement, accountable for their responses to gender violence, and those
seeking redress from individuals who committed gender violence.2 5 Unlike other
civil rights initiatives, such as those seeking racial equality, civil rights reform
addressing gender violence did not proceed as part of a deliberate legal strategy.26
The cases can be thought of as progressing in two waves. The first series of cases
began in the 1970's and challenged law enforcement's under-responsiveness to
calls from domestic violence survivors.27 These cases spurred litigation seeking
law enforcement accountability, often under the traditional civil rights law, 42
19. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 32, 34-47 (2007) (discussing "civil rights" approaches as focusing on discrimination
and unequal treatment); Will Maslow & Joseph B. Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for
Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 363 (1953) (defining civil rights as "those rights commonly
denied because of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry," and as distinct from civil liberties,
which reference other rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Constitution).
20. Diller, supra note 19, at 35-36.
21. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 164 (1991) ("[t]he concept of
rights, both positive and negative, is the marker of our citizenship, our relation to others"). The notion of
"rights" also has been critiqued as being insufficient alone to produce transformative change. See, e.g.
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (2004) (tracing the myth, politics, and strategists of
rights in movements for social change).
22. See generally RICHARD FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG 10-11 (2011) (arguing that civil rights "do too
much and not enough at the same time").
23. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 U.S. 1350 (2011) (limiting scope of liability for prosecutorial
misconduct); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (precluding procedural due process
claim against law enforcement for failed response to domestic violence calls); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down civil rights remedy of 1994 Violence Against Women Act as
unconstitutional).
24. Doctrinally, those civil rights strategies may be seen as distinct from other substantive categories
such as family law or criminal justice, even though both invoke liberty and equality-based concerns.
25. See infra Parts I.B. & I.C.
26. Cf TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERs (1988) (describing, civil rights litigation strategy,
amongst other things); MARK V. TUsHNEr, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (2005) (same).
27. See infra Parts I.B & I.C.
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U.S.C. § 1983.28 A second strand of advocacy began in the 1990's, and sought to
frame private acts of gender violence as civil rights violations; efforts focused on
the federal civil rights statute enacted as part of the 1994 federal Violence Against
Women Act.29 Although the legal doctrines underlying both law enforcement
accountability claims and the constitutionally permissible scope of civil remedies
for gender violence have suffered setbacks in court, the need for accountability
has not diminished. Both institutional and individual accountability measures
remain promising and needed areas for future reform.
The changing nature of discrimination and other civil rights violations requires
a rethinking of traditional approaches; new frameworks for advancing equality
are needed to address the complex and nuanced ways civil rights violations
manifest in the twenty-first century.30 Against that backdrop, in recent years,
advocacy on issues that historically have been addressed under the rubric of civil
rights, such as equality and due process, have invoked human rights frame-
works.3 ' Contemporary United States-based civil rights lawyers increasingly
invoke the human rights frame and human rights strategies to advance the social
and economic, as well as civil and political, rights claims that animate social
change arguments.3 2 To a large extent, both human rights and civil rights
campaigns seek consistent and overlapping goals.
International human rights law's robust interpretations of anti-discrimination
and liberty-based protections can spur reform by exemplifying alternatives to
those adopted under United States law.34 For example, international human rights
law and other countries' national authorities increasingly recognize that gender
28. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See
infra Part I.C.
30. For examples of such approaches, see, e.g., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (Heather
Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2002); Linda H. Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALF. L. REV. 997 (2006).
31. For a history and discussion of the use of human rights principles in the United States, see, e.g.,
CYNTHIA SOOHOO ET AL., BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHrs (2008).
32. Cynthia Soohoo, Human Rights and the Transformation of the "Civil Rights" and "Civil
Liberties" Lawyer, in SOOHOO, supra note 31, vol. 2 ch. 4.
33. See, e.g., Alma Lu Beltran y Puga et al., Gender Justice in the Americas: A Transnational
Dialogue on Sexulity, Violence, Reproduction, and Human Rights, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 751 (2011)
(discussing connections between human rights and women's rights in the context of sexuality, violence,
and reproduction); CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, BRIEFING PAPER, REPRODUCIVE RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AS
TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMEN' A CRITICAL HUMAN RIGHTS
ANALYSIS (2011), available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/
TCIDT.pdf. For discussion of the use of human rights principles in civil rights issues including workers
rights, immigration, rights of indigenous peoples, capital punishment, prisoners' rights; housing,
healthcare, reproductive rights, welfare, environmental justice and disaster relief, see generally, e.g.,
SooHoO, supra note 31, vol. 3.
34. See, e.g., Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 80/11, [hereinafter Inter-Am. Comm'n], (2011) (finding U.S. to have violated international
obligations to take reasonable action in response to domestic violence calls). For further discussion of
that case see infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
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violence violates human rights, 3  and require states to provide protection to
victims, and to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute and
punish perpetrators. 36 A developing body of international human rights decisions
holds states accountable based on findings that they knew or should have known
of real and immediate risks to an individual by another person, and failed to take
reasonable steps to prevent the harm.3 This shift in global understandings should
prod U.S. policy makers to rethink how U.S. law and policy might better ensure
institutional and individual accountability for gender violence.
The following sections review civil rights-based law reform initiatives in the
United States seeking both institutional and individual accountability for harms
associated with gender violence. They trace the trajectory of caselaw limiting
redress and posit reasons why there has been no recent advocacy for a renewed
civil rights oriented response.
35. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 63/155, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/155 (Jan. 30, 2009) (resolution adopted by
the General Assembly, Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 63/155], available at http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/
policy.and-research/un/63/ARES_63_155_.EN.pdf; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), Preamble, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1981). available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/; Comm. on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women. Gen. Rec. 19, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992) (addressing
Violence Against Women), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/
recomm.htm; Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., Preamble, U.N. Doc. 1/49/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 UN Decl. on Elim. of VAW].
See also supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Elimination of Domestic Violence Against Women, Res. 58/147, U.N. G.A.O.R., 58th
Sess., 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/147 (Feb. 19, 2004); 1993 UN Decl. on Elim. of VAW, supra note 35 at
Art. 4.c.; G.A. Conf., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 91 18, 28, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993). For a history and further discussion of the due diligence standard as a
tool for eliminating gender violence, see Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and
Consequences, The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
Yakin Erturk, U.N. Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006).
37. See, e.g., Opuz v. Turkey, No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 130 (2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=851046&portal=hbkm&source=
extemalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649; Campo Algodonero v.
Mexico, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Nos. 12.496, 12.497, and 12.498, 141-143 (Nov. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.cidh.org/demandas/12.496-7-8%20Campo%20Algodonero%2OMexico%204%20noviembre%
202007%20ENG.pdf; Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
A.T. v. Hungary U.N. Doc. A/60/38 (Jan. 26, 2005), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/
jurisprudence/treaty/cedaw/opt//node/4/filename/hungary t5_cedaw_2_2003, (finding Hungary liable
for failing to offer resources and help to domestic violence survivors); Views of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Goekce v. Austria, U.N. Doc. C/39/D/5/2005 (Aug. 6,
2007), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/jurisprudence/treaty/cedaw/opt/0/node/4/
filename/austriacedaw t5_5_2005, (finding Austria liable for failing to aid domestic violence victim
who was killed by her husband). A few countries' national courts also have recognized states'
accountability for private acts of gender violence. See, e.g., Melanie Randall, Private Law, the State and
the Duty to Protect: Tort Actions for Police Failures in Gendered Violence Cases, 44 Sup. CT. L.R. (2d)
(2009) (discussing Canadian cases); Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2001 (3) SA 305 (SA) para.
61 (S.Afr.) (imposing "general norm of accountability" on South African state actors, such as the police,
for responding to gender violence). For discussion, see, e.g., Carolyn Bettinger-Lopez, Human Rights at
Home: Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Violation, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 19 (2008).
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B. LAW ENFORCEMENT AccOuNTABILrrY
The connection between civil rights and gender violence has long roots in
anti-gender violence law reform. Civil rights claims seeking state accountability
for law enforcement responsiveness to domestic or sexual violence calls have
played an important role in improving law enforcement policies. Beginning in
the 1970's, survivors of domestic and sexual violence and their families brought
suits to hold law enforcement accountable for failed responses to calls for
assistance. Many of those claims were brought under federal civil rights
statutes, and advanced arguments that law enforcement policies violated
survivors' equal protection and due process rights.4 0 Those cases were brought in
an era when law enforcement officers commonly refused altogether to take action
when called to respond to a "domestic" dispute, or reacted in ways that did not
hold the perpetrator to account.41 The suits widely are recognized as having
prompted changes in law enforcement policy and practice.42 For example, laws
and policies developed to require or encourage law enforcement responsiveness
to domestic violence calls, often by removing police discretion through
mandatory arrest policies.4 3 Other reforms improved documentation of domestic
38. Although this discussion is framed in terms of law enforcement accountability generally, most
litigation challenging systematic responses to gender violence has focused on police responsiveness.
Nevertheless, for example, the record of gender bias Congress considered in enacting the 1994 VAWA
addressed both civil and criminal justice systems, and prosecutorial as well as policing functions. See,
e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (recognizing VAWA's legislative record
demonstrating insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated crime, state justice system
participants' perpetuation of discriminatory stereotypes, and unacceptably lenient sentences for
perpetrators). Of course, civil rights cases brought under section 1983 and other statutes address related
claims, such as those involving gender violence that occurs in the workplace or at school, or claims
involving sexual assault committed by law enforcement or other officials. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid,
Elusive Equality in Domestic and Sexual Violence Law Reform, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 731,745-56 (2007)
(discussing applicability of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to perpetrators of
gender-based violence). See also infra note 126 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988); Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); Thurman v.
City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1985); Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582 (1979).
40. See, e.g., Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1525. For further discussion of these cases, see infra Part III.A.
& B.
41. LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTiC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 9 (2011);
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 44 (2000); Emily J. Sack,
Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L.
REv. 1657, 1667-69.
42. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 41 at 44; G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory
Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L.
REV. 237, 276-77 (2005); Sack, supra note 41; see also, e.g., MEG TOWNSEND ET AL., LAW ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CALLS FOR SERVICE 8-9 (2005), available at https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/215915.pdf (summarizing history of cases that establish law enforce-
ment's potential financial liability if they failed to adequately protect victims).
43. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 41, at 1670-71. These mandatory and pro-arrest policies themselves are
controversial, but they represent a move to require responses where police previously had walked away
from calls.
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violence incidents and enhanced law enforcement training on domestic violence
issues."
The Supreme Court decision in Castle Rock v. Gonzales45 follows in this line
of cases. The case involved a tragic set of facts, which have been widely
reported.46 Jessica Lenahan47 sued the local police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Sec-
tion 1983"), alleging substantive and procedural due process violations, after
local law enforcement repeatedly failed to respond to her requests that they take
steps to enforce the domestic violence protective order she had against her
estranged husband.4 8 The police responded to her multiple calls for assistance by,
among other things, telling her they could not help her because the children were
with their father, and chastising her for "making us freak out and thinking the kids
are gone."49 Ms. Lenahan's fears that her estranged husband had abducted her
children turned out to be founded; he eventually showed up at the police
department, a shooting ensued, and her children were found dead in the trunk of
his car.5 o
Jessica Lenahan sued the town of Castle Rock, seeking accountability and
redress for the immeasurable loss she had suffered."' She alleged that the town of
Castle Rock had violated her due process rights by failing properly to respond to
complaints of restraining order violations, and by tolerating non-enforcement of
restraining orders.s2 She appealed the trial court's initial rejection of her claim,
after which a panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the rejection of
her substantive due process claim, but found that she had alleged a cognizable
procedural due process claim. 3 A divided en banc court agreed, finding that she
had a "protected property interest in the enforcement of her restraining order,"
and that the town had violated her procedural due process rights because the
police never seriously responded to her request for enforcement. 54 The Supreme
Court decision addressed only the procedural due process claims. 5 The Court
44. Id. at 1671.
45. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
46. See supra note 7. For further discussion of the case, see, e.g., Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 13.
47. The case initially was brought under the name Jessica Gonzales; the plaintiff subsequently
changed her surname to Lenahan, and I will use that name to reference her here.
48. Inter-Am. Comm'n, supra note 34, atl[ 2, 18-31.
49. Id. at 26-32.
50. Id. at 32.
51. The claim brought in the U.S. District Court alleged that the town of Castle Rock violated Jessica
Lenahan's due process rights because "its police department had an official policy or custom of failing to
respond properly to complaints of restraining order violations" and "of tolerating the non-enforcement of
restraining orders," and that the town's actions "were taken either willfully, recklessly or with such gross
negligence as to indicate wanton disregard and deliberate indifference" to Ms. Lenahan's civil rights.
Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 754.
52. Id. at 754-55.
53. Id. at 754.
54. Id. at 754-55
55. Id. (distinguishing substantive due process claims from the procedural due process claim before
the Court). The lower courts had concluded that Ms. Lenahan's claim did not fall within the narrow
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rejected the procedural due process claim, and concluded that Ms. Lenahan had
no protected property interest that would give rise to a procedural due process
claim."
Having exhausted her recourse in U.S. courts, Jessica Lenahan appealed the
Supreme Court's decision to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR)." The IACHR found the United States to be in violation of
international human rights obligations to take reasonable steps to protect women
from domestic violence.58 The Commission's ruling was its first in a women's
rights case against the United States.5 9 It concluded that the United States failed
to act with due diligence to protect Jessica Lenahan and her daughters from
domestic violence, and that the United States' failure violated its obligation not to
discriminate and to provide for equal protection before the law.s The Commis-
sion made numerous recommendations, including that the United States adopt or
reform legislation to ensure mandatory enforcement of protection orders.6 1 It also
recommended the continued adoption of public policies and programs aimed at
restructuring the stereotypes of domestic violence victims, and at promoting the
eradication of discriminatory socio-cultural patterns that impede women and
children's full protection from domestic violence.6 2 Although the United States
has taken the position that it is not bound to the American Declaration, 3 the
Commission's decision at a minimum constitutes persuasive authority for
reconsidering the adequacy of the United States' legal and policy-based
approach."
The IACHR decision and corresponding international developments elaborat-
ing state obligations to exercise due diligence with respect to gender violence
should inspire us to reconsider how existing and potential remedies can best
ensure law enforcement accountability. For example, the fact that the U.S.
"state-created danger" exception to the DeShaney decision's rule that the state has no duty to protect its
citizens from harm committed by a private third party, since there was no indication that the police
created or enhanced the danger posed by Simon Gonzales. See Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093,
1099 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2002). The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the distinction between the respective theories, see 366 F.3d at
1099-1100, and the Supreme Court did not disturb that distinction. See, e.g., Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at
755-56 (distinguishing substantive from procedural due process theories). For discussion of the
significance of this limited holding, see infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
56. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766.
57. Inter-Am. Comm'n, supra note 34, atIn 1, 40-44.
58. See, e.g., id. at 1I 15-35 (summarizing States' legal obligation to protect women from domestic
violence under international human rights law). For further discussion of the case, see infra notes 60-63
and accompanying text.
59. See Elizabeth M. Schneider et al., Implementing the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights' Domestic Violence Ruling in Lenahan v. United States: Advocates Take Up the Challenge, 46
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 113 (2012).
60. Inter-Am. Comm'n, supra note 34, at 199.
61. Id. at 201.4.
62. Id. at 201.6.
63. Id. at155.
64. See Schneider et al., supra note 59.
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Supreme Court decision addressed only Ms. Lenahan's procedural due process
claim is notable, particularly given that previous cases largely had been based
either on equal protection or substantive due process theories.6 5 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court decision leaves undisturbed those other, more frequently used,
theories under which survivors of gender violence have held and continue to hold
law enforcement accountable for failed responses to domestic and sexual
violence calls.6 6 The IACHR decision serves as a reminder to think broadly about
how U.S. law and policy most effectively can advance the shared interests in
equality and due process that underlie both U.S. and international law and policy.
C. INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
A second strand of anti-gender violence advocacy explicitly invoked a civil
rights frame. Legislative efforts in the United States in the 1990's focused on
remedies holding individual perpetrators accountable. The civil rights remedy
enacted as part of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994 is the most
prominent of those remedies.67 That law afforded a private right of action by a
victim against the perpetrator of gender-motivated violence. 68 It sought to frame
gender-based violence in the same category as other civil rights violations,' 9 and
to add a remedy to then-existing federal civil rights laws which afforded redress
against private institutions,70 groups of individuals,' or state actors, both
individual and institutional. 7 2 It was designed to fill a gap in accountability
measures: no then-existing federal civil rights law provided redress against the
private individuals who committed most of those violations. The private right
of action against an individual perpetrator held the potential for practical and
transformative redress: it both could afford compensation for the economic losses
65. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of
Protection Deflect DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1280, 1287 (1990) (discussing theories).
66. For discussion of cases, see supra Part III. Nevertheless, as Laura Oren has observed, the Court
does not appear favorably disposed to the state-created danger exception. See Laura Oren, Some
Thoughts on The State-Created Danger Doctrine: DeShaney is Still Wrong and Castle Rock is More of
the Same, 17 TEMP. POL &. CV. RTs. L. REv. 47, 59 (2006) (recognizing Castle Rock majority's reasoning
grouped its rejection of Jessica Lenahan's procedural due process claim with previous DeShaney ruling
rejecting substantive due process claim).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). For
commentary on the decision, see supra note 3. For a discussion of state laws providing similar relief, see,
e.g., Julie Goldscheid, The VAWA Civil Rights Provision: Shaping It, Saving It, Litigating It, Losing It, 11
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 543, 548-51 (2010) [hereinafter Shaping It]; Julie Goldscheid, The Civil Rights
Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down but not Ruled Out, 39 A.B.A. FAM. L.Q.
157 (2005) [hereinafter Struck Down].
68. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
69. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 16-18 (2000), at 7; see
generally Struck Down, supra note 67, at 160-64 (summarizing legislative history).
70. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012) [hereinafter Title VII].
71. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
73. See, e.g., Goldfarb, Persistence of Privacy, supra note 69 at 16-18.
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occasioned by the abuse and could shift conceptions of abuse from a private
matter shrouded in secrecy to a matter of public concern.7 4 Both goals advanced
important concerns. Compensatory relief could correct the economic disadvan-
tage produced by abuse; the remedy's transformative goals built on the civil
rights frame's symbolic power to challenge enduring biases and discriminatory
beliefs.
During the years the civil rights remedy was in effect, approximately 50 to 60
cases were decided in favor of both sexual assault and domestic violence
survivors.7 However, the history of those cases was marked by controversy; as
soon as litigants began to invoke the law, defendants began to challenge its
constitutionality.77 Virtually all the courts that addressed the question found it to
be constitutional. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ultimately struck down the
law as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' powers under the Commerce
Clause and under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 9 The Court
rejected arguments that Congress was authorized to enact the law under its
Commerce Clause power, despite the detailed Congressional record of the
myriad ways gender violence impacts women's economic equality.80 The Court
also rejected arguments that the law was justified under Congress' power to enact
laws to remedy equal protection violations, reasoning that Congress' powers to
remedy equal protection violations did not extend to private actors, and that the
Congressional record of discriminatory practices did not include findings from
each of the 50 states.81 The decision was widely critiqued as reflecting both an
unduly narrow view of Congressional authority, and a regressive view of
women's rights.82
Given that the issue before the Court in Morrison was the scope of Congress'
legislative powers, its doctrinal legacy bears more on issues of federalism than on
other existing remedies for gender violence. The decision did nothing to disturb
the other provisions of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act or its reauthoriza-
tions, which, among other things, created funding streams, supported program-
74. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 6, at 506; Goldscheid, supra note 38.
75. Goldscheid, supra note 38, at 768-77.
76. See, e.g., Shaping It, supra note 67, at 548; Struck Down, supra note 67, at 164-65 (summarizing
cases); Julie Goldscheid & Risa Kaufman, Seeking Redress for Gender-Based Bias Crimes-Charting
New Ground in Familiar Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 265, 271-83 (2001) (discussing
decisions).
77. See Struck Down, supra note 67, at 164. Defendants challenged Congress' authority to enact the
law under both the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Julie
Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the ViolenceAgainst Women Act: A
Civil Rights law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (2000) (reviewing
arguments).
78. See, e.g., Shaping It, supra note 67, at 548; Struck Down, supra note 67, at 164-65.
79. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
80. Id. at 617-18.
81. Id. at 626-27.
82. Struck Down, supra note 67, at 159.
5520131
56 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW
ming innovations, and carved out avenues of redress for immigrant survivors of
gender violence.
Consequently, alternative civil rights remedies holding individuals account-
able for committing acts of gender violence could survive review as long as they
avoided the constitutional issues found problematic by the Morrison majority. As
legislation proposed in 2001 and 2003 reflect, federal statutory responses could
afford a modified remedy against a perpetrator and still advance the original
statute's goals, while nevertheless responding to the Morrison Court's constitu-
tional concerns.84 However, this legislative proposal has not galvanized Congres-
85sional attention. Some states and localities picked up on the Supreme Court
majority's call for states to respond8 6 by enacting similar legislation, while other
states retained remedies authorizing private rights of actions against perpetrators
of gender-based violence that had been on the books before the VAWA civil rights
remedy was enacted.
D. UNTAPPED POTENTIAL FOR FEDERAL RESPONSE
One would imagine that decisions such as Castle Rock and Morrison would
spur calls for meaningful reform, much like other criticized Supreme Court
decisions have led to corrective legislative responses.88 There are numerous
political reasons for the absence of a call for a federal legislative response; the
difficulty of galvanizing Congressional support cannot be underestimated.8 9 But
additional factors associated with gender violence claims may be at play as well.
83. Id., at 159-60.
84. See Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 394, 108th Cong. (2003);
Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2001, H.R. 429, 107th Cong. (2001). Both
proposals provided a private right of action against a perpetrator of gender-motivated violence and
required the plaintiff to satisfy a jurisdictional element that ensured a connection in each case with
interstate commerce. For further discussion of potential legislative responses to Morrison, see, e.g.,
Struck Down, supra note 67, at 167-79; Judith Resnik, Drafting, Lobbying, and Litigating VAWA:
National, Local, and Transnational Interventions on Behalf of Women's Equality, 11 GEo. J. GENDER & L.
557, 567-69 (2010).
85. Neither the legislation reauthorizing VAWA in 2005, nor the legislation proposed to reauthorize
VAWA in 2011, contained similar provisions authorizing a private right of action against a perpetrator.
See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-162, 11 Stat. 2960 (2006); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012, H.R. 4970, 112th
Cong. (2012); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2011).
86. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
87. See Struck Down, supra note 67, at 167-71.
88. See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012) (enacted in response to
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1981 et. seq.) (enacted in response to Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); and Martin v. Wilks'Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989)).
89. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Our do-almost-nothing Congress, WASH. PosT, May 2,2012, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-big-talk-no-action-congress/2012/05/02/glQAtOu7uT
story.html; David Firestone, The Cycle of Standoffs, N.Y. TIMES Aug. 1, 2012, available at http://
takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/the-cycle-of-standoffs/; Marc Sandalow, Congress Sinks into
[Vol. XIV:43
CIvI RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE
This section focuses on two: the de-politicization of the movement against
domestic violence, and the limitations of identity politics.
1. Domestic Violence Movement's Partnership With the State
A growing literature critiques the mainstreaming of the United States'
anti-domestic violence movement, 90 and its diminished focus on structural
reform and social change. Although the anti-domestic and sexual violence
movements have made tremendous strides in expanding the availability of
services and focusing public attention on the problem, those advances have
depended in large part on a partnership with the state. 91 Many argue that this
partnership has resulted in a de-politicization, professionalization, and standard-
ization of the anti-domestic violence movement, with an overwhelming and
problematic emphasis on criminal justice responses. 92
In some ways, this critique can be seen as a product of the movement's success.
Increased government funding has expanded the availability of both social
services and legal advocates. Those services are critically important, and
continue to be under-resourced.94 But the expansion in social services and
government funding has shifted the movement's focus from grassroots activism
and calls for structural reform to service delivery, mental health, and criminal
justice responses." Less attention now is directed to structural reform, such as
ending subordination based on race, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, as
well as gender, and increasing social and economic empowerment. Increased
funding has grown the ranks of legal and non-legal advocates engaged in service
delivery, leaving relatively few organizations positioned (or funded) to undertake
Partisan Quagmire, S.F. CHRON Apr. 28, 2005, available at http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/
Congress-sinks-into-partisan-quagmire-2638647.php
90. Although problems with law enforcement responsiveness plague responses to both domestic and
sexual violence calls, this section focuses on the anti-domestic violence movement, which has produced a
more visible and coordinated advocacy response.
91. See, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: How NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED THE
FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1-15 (2008).
92. See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING To BATTERED WOMEN: A
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 47 (2008); GOODMARK,
supra note 41, at 1-6, 25-28; BETH E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND
AMERICA'S PRISON NATION 66-97 (2012); Beth Richie, Reflection on the Antiviolence Movement, 25 SIGNS
1133 (2000); ANDREA SMITH ET AL., The Color of Violence: Introduction, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE
INCITE! ANTHOLOGY (2006).
93. See, e.g., GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 92, at 38; Richie, supra note 92, at 93.
94. See, e.g., NAT'L TASK FORCE To END SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACr (VAWA): A TOOLKIT FOR EDUCATING POLICY MAKERS ABOuT
REAUTHORIZATION 16(2011), http://www.ncadv.org/files/VAWA%20Reauth%2OToolKit%2OFinal%201 1%
2028%2011.pdf (detailing remaining gaps between available funding and demand for services for
domestic and sexual violence survivors).
95. See, e.g., GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 92, at 31-47 (tracing separation from anti-poverty
activists, increased professionalization of services, narrowing range of services available to survivors);
RICHIE, supra note 92, at 65-98 (tracing shifts in the anti-violence movement).
96. See, e.g., GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 92, at 47; RICHIE, supra note 92, at 75-76.
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the systems advocacy work traditionally advanced by the grass-roots advocacy
community.97 Although those engaged in individual representation also engage in
systems-based advocacy, limited resources for systems reform reduces awareness
of the ongoing need for systematic change and the ability to effectively mount
advocacy campaigns.
It follows that the emphasis on services and state collaboration, while valuable,
reduces the likelihood that advocates will take positions in opposition to
established programs. This renders litigation against law enforcement and other
state actors less likely. For example, policy-makers and funders often support
community coordination between stakeholders, including community based
organizations and criminal justice personnel, because they promote coordination
and may improve the quality of services.98 However, they also may privilege
increased prosecution rates as a priority of intervention and as the measure of
success.99 Those partnerships may have the unintended consequence of reducing
advocates' inclination or ability to challenge law enforcement's practices, since it
may become difficult to take a position adverse to an institutional and
programmatic partner. Advocates will be less likely to publicly critique prosecu-
tors for failing to do their jobs when their paychecks are being paid by the
state.1oo
Even if advocates identify problems with law enforcement responses, lawyers
representing survivors may not be trained to commence civil rights litigation.
Government funding has increased the availability of lawyers trained to represent
survivors in family law cases.o Those lawyers make critical differences in
survivors'lives, and the need far outpaces the availability of legal services.10 2 But
family law attorneys typically are not trained in federal civil rights litigation and
the private bar may not have the capacity, either in expertise or staffing, available
to represent survivors.'o Only a few not-for-profit organizations frame a lack of
law enforcement responsiveness to gender violence claims as a matter that civil
rights laws could address."' As Caroline Bettinger-Lopez has noted, the gap
97. GOODMAN & EPsTEIN, supra note 92, at 47; RICHIE, supra note 92, at 75-76.
98. BUMILLER, supra note 92, at 164-65.
99. Id. at 165.
100. GOODMARK, supra note 41, at 27.
101. See, e.g., Legal Assistance for Victims Grant Program, www.ovx.usdoj.gov/fy201 1-grant-
program.htm #12 (enumerating grantees for 67 grants totaling $31,930,180 awarded in 2011).
102. See, e.g., Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Explaining the Recent Decline in Domestic Violence,
21 CoNTm. EcON. Pol'Y 158 (2003) (finding increased access to legal representation helps explain
decline in domestic violence during the 1990's).
103. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 41, at 95 (describing limited availability of lawyers trained in
domestic violence issues); see also, e.g., National Domestic Violence Volunteer Attorney Network Act, S.
1515, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing pilot program coordinating a system of volunteer attorneys to
ensure safe, culturally and linguistically appropriate legal representation for domestic violence victims).
104. For example, the Women's Justice Center explicitly calls for challenges to gender-biased law
enforcement responses that deny women access to justice. See WOMEN'S JUST. CTR., Highlighting the
Gendered Blind Spot, Engaging Social Justice and Civil Rights Groups in Securing Women's Justice
Rights, http://justicewomen.comlcj-genderedblindspot.htnl (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). The ACLU
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between the work of domestic violence service providers and civil and human
rights organizations "is pronounced."' 05
The net result of the shift from activism to service delivery with the
accompanying increase in state funding for programs and services has reduced
the likelihood that problems with law enforcement responsiveness will be framed
as matters of civil rights. The absence of a vibrant civil rights frame for gender
violence claims shapes public discourse accordingly. It masks problems that
might surface through an equality or due process lens and in turn limits the
potential for policy-based reform.
2. Limits of Identity Politics
The absence of a call for reform reflects another movement trend as well.
Considered on their face, claims against law enforcement for failed responses to
gender violence readily should be categorized as cases of police misconduct.
Like cases involving overuse of police power, gender violence-based claims of
under-responsiveness also often involve violations of due process, whether they
result from violent infringement of liberty, or from law enforcement interven-
tions, or lack of interventions, that increase the risk of harm to private
individuals.' 0 6 Accordingly, both often lead to litigation under the civil rights
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.107
But claims of law enforcement under-responsiveness to gender violence calls
generally are not treated as cases of police misconduct.' 08 The distinct treatment
Women's Rights Project was co-counsel in the Lenahan case at the U.S. Supreme Court and litigates
cases seeking law enforcement accountability for responding reasonably to domestic violence cases. See,
e.g., Valdez v. City of New York - BriefofAmici Curiae New York City Bar Association, American Civil
Liberties Union et al. (July 18, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/valdez-v-city-new-
york-brief-amici-curiae-new-york-city-bar-association-american-civil. The Women's Law Project has
had a longstanding project to address the United States' chronic failure to report and investigate rape and
sexual assault. See WOMEN's L. PROJECr, Rape and Sexual Assault, www.womenslawproject.org/
NewPages/wkVAWSexualAssault.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). Other organizations dedicated to
gender equality and civil rights also have litigated cases seeking law enforcement accountability for
gender violence. See, e.g., CENTER FOR CONsT. RTs., http://ccrjustice.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2012);
LEGAL MOMENTUM, http://www.legalmomentum.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2012); NAT'L WOMEN'S L.
CENTER, http://www.nwlc.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). By and large, these organizations engage in
impact-oriented advocacy, and are not the organizations representing survivors in domestic violence
cases in family and criminal courts; their capacity for assuming cases is necessarily limited. The National
Center for Women and Policing advocates increased representation of women on police forces as a way to
improve law enforcement's response to violence against women, but does not engage in individual
representation or litigation. See Kim LONSWAY ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR WOMEN & POLICING, HIRING &
RETAINING MORE WOMEN: THE ADVANTAGES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 7-8 (2003), http://
www.womenandpolicing.org/pdf/NewAdvantagesReport.pdf.
105. Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 13, at 189.
106. See, e.g., MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MIsCONDucT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2 (2011)
(describing conduct giving rise to police misconduct claims).
107. See generally id. (detailing use of § 1983 to address police misconduct).
108. A notable exception is Alexandra Natapoff's article on Underenforcement, which frames
underenforcement, including underenforcement of domestic violence calls, as a problem of police
misconduct. 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1715 (2006).
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of cases of over and under enforcement reflects the limitations of traditional
identity politics and single-identity group advocacy.' 09 Police misconduct cases
involving over-enforcement historically are associated with race-based miscon-
duct while cases involving under-enforcement-typically, domestic and sexual
violence-are seen in terms of gender-based misconduct.o Legal doctrines
framing discrimination claims as either race or sex based discrimination fuel this
single-identity approach."'
The traditional single-identity-based approach to police misconduct obscures
the connection between over- and under-enforcement.1 2 The cases may be seen
as posing distinct issues even though both may reflect issues of both race and
gender bias." 3 To the extent the issues are publicized by advocacy groups, the
distinct framing of the respective categories of cases may reflect the limitations of
identity politics and the challenges of translating intersectionality theory into
practice.' 14
Recent initiatives are beginning to surface the limitations of these identity-
based distinctions as organizations and grass-roots campaigns increasingly
address the overlap between multiple forms of subordination."' With respect to
109. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence
Against Women of Color 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection between Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAnti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
110. See, e.g., WOMEN'S JUST. CTR., supra note 104 (critiquing traditional social justice and civil rights
groups' failure to challenge under-enforcement of crimes against women as well as over-aggressive
policing practices, which primarily affect males); see also AVERY, supra note 106, §§ 2:4-2:7 (discussing
racially motivated misconduct).
11l. Cf, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1439 (2009) (discussing difficulty of prevailing in claims alleging multiple forms of
discrimination).
112. Cf, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 29-75 (1997) (detailing law
enforcement failure to protect African Americans from crime); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The
Wages ofAntiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique ofChicago v. Morales, 1998 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 197
(critiquing decision striking down anti-loitering statute as not serving community's best interests).
113. See, e.g., RIGHTS woRKING GROUP, (June 29, 2012), http://rightsworkinggroup.org/content/racial-
profiling-gender-lgbtq-awareness-week (collecting materials and blog postings). For example, Jessica
Lenahan is part Native American and part Latina. See, ACLU videos, Domestic Violence & Human
Rights: Lenahan v. USA, YouTUBE (Oct. 24, 2011), www.youtube.com/watchv=UvPtMCrl4J4. Studies
indicate that poor women and women of color may be at greatest risk of law enforcement
under-responsiveness to their calls for assistance. Victoria Frye et al., Dual Arrest and Other Unintended
Consequences of Mandatory Arrest in New York City: A Brief Report, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 397,401-02,
404(2007).
114. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Intersectionality in Theory and Practice, in INTERSECTIONAL-
rrY AND BEYOND: LAW, POWER AND THE POLITICS OF LOCATION 124 (Grabham et al. eds., 2009) (discussing
the challenges of applying intersectionality theory).
115. See, e.g., Women of Color and the Courts, LEGAL MOMENTUM, http://www.legalmomentum.org/
our-work/vaw/njep-issues-pages/women-of-color-and-the-courts.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (recog-
nizing combined effect of race and gender-based discrimination); Hispanic Victims of Domestic Violence
Might Need a Different Approach, NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.nclr.org/
index.php/aboutus/news/blog/hispanic-victims ofdomesticviolencemight-need_a_different_
approach/ (discussing culturally competent violence prevention education); The Truth Commission on
[Vol. XIV:43
CIVIL RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE
policing practices, for example, the proposed End Racial Profiling Act of 2011
would add gender to the list of prohibited grounds for profiling, recognizing that
gender, as well as race and often religion, frequently combine as the bases of
biased police practices.' 16 African American women may be profiled as users,
couriers or purveyors of drugs."' 7 Women of color, including transgender women
of color and immigrant women, are often profiled as being engaged in
prostitution." 8 Muslim, Arab, and South-Asian women who wear hijab may be
profiled as part of the "war on terror."ll 9 But this intersecting approach still
constitutes the exception, rather than the general trend.
A call for law enforcement involvement may be met with skepticism by
communities of color and other marginalized communities, such as the LGBT
community, given problems of over-policing and its attendant harms.120 But
those concerns should not excuse a failure to respond to calls involving
gender-based violence when survivors seek law enforcement intervention.
Under-enforcement is especially worrisome if, as studies suggest, survivors in
communities of color face greater difficulty obtaining assistance from law
enforcement for domestic or sexual violence, 12 1 at the same time that they suffer
the consequences of over-policing. 12 2 Policies and practices that endorse law
enforcement discretion to disregard survivors' calls for assistance undermine
survivors' autonomy, much the same as mandatory arrest policies.12 3 The same
critique should apply to both. That some of the cases challenging law
enforcement's under-responsiveness to gender violence have been brought by
Black Women and Sexual Violence, BLACK WOMEN'S BLUEPRINT, http://www.blackwomensblueprint.org/
sexual-violencel (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (advocating intersectional advocacy).
116. See End Racial Profiling Act of 2011, S. 1670, 112th Cong. § 2(7) (2011) (defining "racial
profiling" to include practices based on gender). For a discussion of the intersections of race, gender, and
sexual orientation as they relate to racial and religious profiling, see, e.g., Racial Profiling: Gender &
LGBTQ Awareness Week, RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, supra note 113. See also, e.g., JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL.,
QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) (arguing that
policing of sex and gender reinforces racial and gender inequalities).
117. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE: BETTER TARGETING OF AIRLINE
PASSENGERS FOR PERSONAL SEARCHES COULD PRODUCE BETTER RESULTS 10 (2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228979.pdf (finding that black women who were U.S. citizens were nine
times as likely as white women to be x-rayed after being frisked or patted down, but were less than half as
likely to be found carrying contraband as white women who were U.S. citizens).
118. Andrea Ritchie, What's Gender Got to do with Racial Profiling?, RIGHTS WORKING GROUP (Sept.
14, 2012), http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/content/whats-gender-got-do-with-racial-profiling.
119. Id.
120. See infra Part V.A.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its
Causes and Consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, paras. 14,50-66, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/26/Add.5 (June
1, 2011) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur] (detailing compound challenges of women who face multiple
forms of discrimination).
123. For critiques of mandatory arrest laws, see, e.g., GOODMARK, supra note 41, at 118-24; Donna
Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REv. 801 (2001); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 1657 (2004).
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women of color underscores the importance of these cases as part of a robust civil
rights response.124
II. REVIVING CIVIL RIGHTS: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
AS POLICE MISCONDUCT
A new federal civil rights-based approach to gender violence might take
several forms. This section focuses on institutional accountability and argues that
new strategies could productively address ongoing problems with law enforce-
ment responses to gender violence calls. It sets the stage for later sections, which
in turn review the availability of relief under current federal civil rights laws, and
propose administrative and community-based strategies to complement litigation-
based remedies.
A. INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS
Historically, civil rights claims to redress gender violence have encompassed
claims against both individual and institutional actors.'2 5 While both are
important, I focus here on new approaches to institutional accountability. This
approach builds on civil rights laws' historic role in holding institutions
accountable for discrimination and other rights violations.12 6 The civil rights
frame foregrounds the notion that gender violence, and institutional responses to
it, are a matter of public concern for which we share collective responsibility.127
Specifically, reform could focus on law enforcement, given ongoing problems in
obtaining evenhanded responses. 1 28 Even the Supreme Court majority in
Morrison acknowledged that there is a problem with state justice systems'
124. See supra note 113 (noting that, for example, Jessica Lenahan is part Native American and part
Latina).
125. See supra Parts I.B. & C.
126. Institutional accountability can be advanced through the law enforcement accountability
measures advocated here, or through other strategies, for example, holding employers liable for
discriminatory and other failed responses to employees coping with abuse. See, e.g., Maria Amelia Calaf,
Comment, Breaking the Cycle: Title VII, Domestic Violence, and Workplace Discrimination, 21 LAw &
INEQ. 167, 186-91 (2003); Julie Goldscheid, Disparate Impact's Impact: The Gender Violence Lens, 90
ORE. L. REv. 33 (2011); Julie Goldscheid, Gendered Violence and Work: Reckoning with the Boundaries
ofSex Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61 (2008); John E. Matejkovic, Which Suit Would
You Like? The Employer's Dilemma in Dealing with Domestic Violence, 33 CAP. U. L. REv. 309, 336
(2004); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the Abused?: Is Termination the Solution When Domestic
Violence Comes to Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 294-95 (2006); Nina W. Tarr, Employment and
Economic Security for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 16 S. CAL. REv. L. & Soc. JusT. 371, 393-94 (2007);
Wendy R. Weiser & Deborah A. Widiss, Employment Protection for Domestic Violence Victims, 38
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 3, 6-7 (2004); Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The
Explosion of State Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 669
(2008).
127. See supra note 74 (discussing VAWA civil rights remedy's transformational goals).
128. These problems are discussed in Part H.B., infra.
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responses to gender violence.12 9 Remedies directed against the institutional
biases that continue to present barriers to justice for survivors of gender violence
hold potential to produce meaningful change in the day-to-day responses
survivors receive from law enforcement.13 0
A focus on institutional accountability would be consistent with the approach
of other federal civil rights laws, which, correctly or incorrectly, generally
privilege institutional over individual liability.' 3 ' For example, Title VII claims
primarily hold liable the institutional employer, rather than an individual
discriminator. Virtually all jurisdictions preclude claims against an individual
under Title VII. 132 Claims under section 1983 may be directed at individuals,
although individuals often are shielded from liability through qualified immu-
nity.13 3 Litigation seeking policy-based reform often is directed at institutions, for
example, through claims holding municipalities liable for failing to train, or for
maintaining a policy or practice that violates constitutional or statutory rights. 134
Institutional accountability can advance structural reform by spurring policy and
procedural change. 3 Individual accountability no doubt is important, but is
inherently limited in cases of gender violence, given, among other things, the
difficulties of recovery and survivors' understandable resistance to re-engaging
with abusers through elective litigation.13 6
129. The Morrison majority acknowledged that the 1994 civil rights remedy was enacted in response
to a "voluminous" record of gender bias in state justice systems. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
620(2000).
130. Indeed, in considering police accountability generally, an "emerging consensus" rejects the
so-called "rotten apple" theory that individual "bad" officers lead to misconduct; instead, inadequate
management policies and practices are recognized to be more likely to be the cause. Samuel Walker &
Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State "Pattern or Practice"
Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 483-84 (2009).
131. The wisdom of preferring institutional as opposed to individual liability is a question beyond the
scope of this paper. For example, in urging enactment of the VAWA civil rights remedy, proponents
highlighted the value of individual accountability. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 138 (discussing
civil remedy holding perpetrators directly accountable as a way of altering perpetrators' behavior, and
valuing and restoring survivors).
132. See, e.g., Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2010); Van Horn v. Best Buy
Stores, 526 F.3d 1144, 1147 (8th Cit. 2008); Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cit. 2006); Foley
v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 340 n.8 (5th Cit. 2003); Glebocki v. City of Chi., 32 F. App'x 149,
154 (7th Cir. 2002); Lissau v. S. Food Servs., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cit. 1998); Walthen v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 115 F.3d 400, 406 (6th Cir. 1997); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996); Sheridan v.
E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314
(2d Cir. 1995); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cit. 1993).
133. See Martin A. Schwartz & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Chapter 15, in SECTION 1983 LmGATION (2d ed.
2008).
134. See id. at Chapter 10.
135. See, e.g., supra note 41 (discussing policy responses to lawsuits brought against municipalities
for failed responses to domestic and sexual violence).
136. See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 38, at 768-77. Similar critiques of reliance on private litigation
as a remedy against individuals have been raised in in other civil rights contexts. Cf, e.g., Olatunde
Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J.
CONsT. L. 1191, 1201-07 (2011) (proposing administrative accountability as an additional tool to address
racial discrimination in housing, in light of the limits of individual litigation).
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The use of civil rights laws to prod law enforcement responsiveness to
marginalized groups is not new. As Zanita Fenton has argued, police refusal to
protect battered women is analogous to law enforcement's historic refusal to
enforce the law to protect African-Americans, which led to the enactment of the
Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, including section 1983.137 One of the
core purposes of that law was to provide a federal remedy for non-enforcement of
state remedies to prevent violence against individuals. 3  Indeed, Section 1983 is
the statute often used to redress cases of police misconduct involving over-
enforcement.139
Implicit in the VAWA civil rights remedy's focus on individual liability was the
assumption that the bedrock civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section
1983"), would afford redress in cases alleging institutional failures involving
state actors.140 Ongoing problems with law enforcement accountability demon-
strate the continued need for both robust enforcement of existing legal theories,
and for new and complementary strategies that would advance greater account-
ability. As Part III details, section 1983 affords increasingly narrow, but
nevertheless viable, avenues for redress.
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Ongoing problems with law enforcement policies and practices with respect to
gender violence counsel renewed efforts to promote accountability. The United
Nations Special Rapporteur has documented the historic and ongoing problems
with enforcement of anti-domestic violence laws in the United States.141 Recent
Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations confirm the enduring nature of these
practices with respect to police response to both domestic and sexual violence.
For example, the DOJ's investigation of the New Orleans Police Department
(NOPD) revealed gender biased policing, based, among other things, on
misclassifications of many possible sexual assault cases that resulted in failure to
137. Fenton, supra note 7 at 388; accord, Natapoff, supra note 16 (recognizing law enforcement's
historic responses to domestic violence as a problem of underenforcement).
138. Fenton, supra note 7 at 388.
139. See, e.g., MICHAEL AvERY Er AL., PoLICE MISCONDUCT- LAW AND LITIGATlON (2012).
140. Goldfarb, supra note 6, at 508. Other remedies, such as Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
provide redress in cases of private institutions' failed responses to gender violence. See, e.g., Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
141. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, supra note 122 at paras. 13-17, 54, 61, 83; accord Inter-Am.
Com'n, supra note 34, at paras. 96, 97 (referencing reports). Recent studies confirm ongoing problems
with law enforcement, including persistent under-reporting of domestic and sexual violence. See, e.g.,
LYNN LANGTON & MARCUS BERZOFSKY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VicrhuzATIONs NOT REPorrED TO
THE POLICE, 2006-2010 4, 6 (2012), available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/BJSVictimizations
NotReportedToThePolice2006-2010_8-2012.pdf (reporting that 65 percent of sexual assault victimiza-
tions and 46 percent of intimate partner violence victimizations were not reported to police in time period
studied).
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investigate a significant number of potential sex crimes,142 missing or inadequate
investigation and documentation, and indications that staff relied on stereotypical
assumptions and judgments about sex crimes and victims of sex crimes.14 3 The
DOJ found "systemic deficiencies" in NOPD's handling of domestic violence
cases as well.'" It detailed NOPD's lack of specific guidance regarding
important functions, such as protocols for 911 operators taking domestic violence
calls, and procedures for investigation and follow up.14 5 It also detailed grossly
inadequate training of law enforcement in how to investigate domestic violence
claims, leading to failures of follow up, and minimal efforts to find and interview
witnesses.146 The DOJ investigation resulted in a consent decree in which NOPD
agreed, among other things, to develop and implement a set of policies and
procedures reflecting improved responses to sexual assault' 47 and domestic
violence.14 8
In its investigation of the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD), the DOJ
similarly found "troubling evidence" that PRPD failed adequately to respond to
police sexual assault and domestic violence cases.149 The investigation detailed
that PRPD reported dramatically lower numbers of reported forcible rapes as
compared to murders than virtually all other jurisdictions (which reported more
forcible rapes than murders).' 50 This finding suggested to the DOJ that PRPD
was under-classifying the numbers of rapes reported. The DOJ investigative
report also cited low levels of orders of protection among women who had been
murdered by their partners, as well as high numbers of women who had been
142. Outdated definitions of rape have contributed to policies and practices in which allegations of sex
crimes are coded as "non-crimes" and consequently not investigated, and interrogations often include
victim-blaming questioning requiring victims to "prove an allegation false." Recent changes to the
Uniform Crime Report's (UCR) definition of rape should help ameliorate the problem. See, e.g., Press
Release, Women's Law Project, Women's Law Project Applauds Attorney General Holder on Changes to
UCR Definition of Rape (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.womenslawproject.org/NewPages/
wkVAWSexualAssaultAG2012.html.
143. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS Div., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEw ORLEANS POLICE DEP'T
43-51(2011) ("NOPD Investigation"), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd-report.pdf.
144. Id. at 43.
145. Id. at 49.
146. Id. at 50.
147. United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924, Case 2:12-cv-01924-SM-JCW, paras.
195-211 (E.D. La., filed July 24, 2012), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/Consent/
12cv01924_Doc2-1.pdf. For example, the consent decree requires the NOPD to incorporate materials on
the realistic dynamics of sexual assault, including issues related to trauma response, into regular training,
and prohibits police officers from coding sexual assaults in a "miscellaneous" or "non-criminal" category
without the express written approval of a higher officer. Id. at paras. 205-07.
148. Id. at paras. 212-22. Under the consent decree, the NOPD agreed to discourage dual arrests of
offenders and victims, id. at para. 214, to incorporate into its ongoing training materials on the dynamics
of domestic violence, id. at paras. 219-21, and to track dispositions of domestic violence investigations,
id. at para. 222.
149. See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Civti RIGHTS Div., INVESTIGATION OF THE PUERrO RICO POLICE DEP'T
54, 57-58 (2011) ("PRPD Investigation"), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
prpdletter.pdf.
150. Id. at 57.
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murdered by their domestic partners, which suggested that police were not doing
enough to inform victims of legal resources available to them.11 The investiga-
tion further reported that PRPD has repeatedly failed to appropriately discipline
officers accused of domestic violence.15 2 Together, these concerns led the DOJ to
conclude that PRPD's institutional oversight may rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.' 5 3
In another investigation, the DOJ similarly raised serious concerns that the
Maricopa County Sheriff's Office failed to investigate a large number of sex
crimes in a manner that may constitute gender and/or national origin discrimina-
tion.154 The Department has also announced a series of investigations into
allegations that the University of Montana Office of Public Safety, Missoula
Police Department, and the Missoula County Attorney's Office failed to
adequately investigate and prosecute alleged sexual assaults against women in
Missoula.'5 5
Ongoing problems with law enforcement responses to domestic and sexual
violence that are inconsistent with constitutional and international human rights
principles call for renewed attention as a matter of civil rights concern. 56 Studies
suggesting that poor women and women of color may be at greatest risk of law
enforcement under-responsiveness to their calls for assistance highlights the
importance of renewed attention.'"
Although current problems may not be of the stark magnitude that led to
reform in the 1980's, they highlight the need for more nuanced, but no less
rigorous, responses. The trajectory of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, ongoing
problems with law enforcement's response to gender violence, and developing
international human rights norms support shifting attention to civil rights
remedies for gender violence that advance institutional accountability for law
enforcement's meaningful response.
m. FEDERAL CIvIL RIGHTS CASELAW
Ongoing enforcement problems raise the question of the effectiveness of
Section 1983 in ensuring law enforcement accountability for gender-biased
policing. That inquiry reveals a nuanced landscape. Popular accounts would
suggest that the Supreme Court's Castle Rock decision eliminated all avenues of
151. Id. at 58.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div.,
to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att'y, Maricopa Cnty, at 15, 16 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.
justice.gov/crtlabout/spl/documents/mcso findletter_12-15-11 .pdf.
155. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces Investigations (May 1,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-crt-561.html.
156. This would not preclude new civil rights remedies holding individuals accountable.
157. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, supra note 122, at paras. 50-6 1; Inter-Am. Comm'n, supra note 34
at para. 161; see also, e.g., Frye et al., supra note 113.
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redress when law enforcement fails to enforce a protective order.'5 The decision
in fact was more limited. The Court rejected procedural due process claims as a
basis for enforcing protective orders.' 59 However, procedural due process had not
been the theory most commonly used for holding law enforcement accountable
for reasonably responding to domestic and sexual violence calls. Other theories,
notably those grounded in procedural due process, had been invoked more
frequently than procedural due process as a basis for holding law enforcement
accountable to domestic and sexual violence survivors.' 6 That said, even though
those theories of recovery formally remain available, the scope of relief has
narrowed in recent years. 16 ' This section outlines the scope of still-available
relief.
A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND "STATE-CREATED DANGER"
Modem Supreme Court caselaw has been marked by decisions limiting civil
rights redress for violence within the family. One early such decision was the
landmark case, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Board of Social Services.16 2 The
case involved allegations that a county department of social services had violated
a boy's substantive due process rights by not removing him from his father's
custody, despite allegations that the department had reason to believe that the
father was abusive to him.'6 3 The Court rejected the claim and concluded that a
State's failure to protect an individual against private violence does not constitute
a due process violation.IM In its reasoning, however, the Court identified
exceptions under which a state may be liable for failing to carry out its duties.
Those include claims based on a showing of a "special relationship" with law
enforcement, for example, through a relationship created by taking someone into
custody,' 6 5 or, more pertinent to domestic violence-related claims, by putting
158. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Rule Police Do Not Have a Constitutional Duty to Protect
Someone, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2005, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/28/politics/
28scotus.html; Fred Barbash, Court Backs Town in Lawsuit Over Domestic Violence; Justices Allow
Police Wide Discretion, WASH. POST, June 28, 2005, at A04, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/27/AR2005062700580.html; Court: Police Can't be Sued for Not
Enforcing Restraining Order, THE DENVER CHANNEL, June 27, 2005, available at http://www.thedenver
channel.com/news/4655165/detail.html.
159. Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005).
160. See supra notes 65-66, and accompanying text.
161. See infra Part III. See also, e.g., Oren, supra note 66 (noting that the Supreme Court may not be
favorably disposed to the state-created danger exception).
162. 489 U.S. 189, 200-01 (1989).
163. Id. at 191-92.
164. Id. at 196-97.
165. Id. at 200-01. Claims based on this "exception" may be thought of as "special relationship"
claims. See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 65, at 1304-07 (1990) (highlighting DeShaney Court's
requirements for satisfying the "special relationship" theory in battered women's cases). Most courts hold
that a "special relationship" would only be established when the state takes a person into custody and
holds her through affirmative exercise of its power, a standard that is not often satisfied in claims by
gender violence victims and their families. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 475 F.3d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 2007)
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someone in a more dangerous position than that which she otherwise would have
experienced. 16 6
As a result, notwithstanding the DeShaney holding, survivors may hold law
enforcement accountable under the state-created danger theory if they can
establish that the officers' affirmative conduct created or increased their risk of
private violence. 16 7 For example, in Okin v. Village of Cornwall, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the substantive due process and municipal
liability claims of Michele Okin based on allegations that, despite her repeated
calls for police assistance, the police neither arrested her former partner Roy
Charles Sears, nor interviewed him at any length about her allegations. 1 6 8 The
officers' actions, such as discussing football with Sears in response to Okin's
complaint that Sears had beaten and tried to choke her, transmitted a message that
Sears would not suffer any consequences for his acts of violence. 16 9 Similarly,
officers' failure to intervene or to arrest in response to Sears' comments that he
could not "help it sometimes when he smacks Michele Okin around," and
officers' failure to file a domestic incident report, to interview Sears, or to make
an arrest in response to Okin's numerous allegations of abuse, further supported
the Court's conclusion that the officers' actions constituted affirmative conduct
that created or increased the risk of violence to her.170
(granting of protection order does not create a special relationship between police officers and individual
who petitioned for the order); Jones v. Union Cnty., 296 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2002) (law enforcement failure
to serve protective order on ex-husband didn't create special relationship); Betran v. El Paso, 367 F.3d
299, 306 (5th Cir. 2004) (911 dispatcher advice suggesting that plaintiff stay in the bathroom and telling
her that police were on their way did not create special relationship because the dispatcher did not
affirmatively place her in custody); Gardner v. Luzeme Cnty., 645 F. Supp. 2d 325, 334-35 (M.D. Pa.
2009) (bail bond agreement signed by domestic violence victim didn't establish custodial relationship);
Dudosh v. Allentown, 722 F. Supp. 1233, 1234-35 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (law enforcement escorting domestic
violence victim to confront her assailant despite knowledge of protective order and his prior dangerous
conduct didn't establish custodial relationship).
166. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200-01. For discussion of the state-created danger exception, see, e.g.,
Laura Oren, Safari Into the Snakepit: the State-Created Danger Doctrine, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
1165 (2005). See also, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims:
Can Orders ofProtection Deflect DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1280 (1990) (enumerating theories);
Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them When
the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788 (1986).
167. See, e.g., Oren, supra note 56 (collecting cases); see also Atinuke 0. Awoyomi, The
State-Created Danger Doctrine in Domestic Violence Cases: Do We Have a Solution in Okin v. Village of
Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Department?, 20 CoLuM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2011); Milena Shtelmakher,
Police Misconduct and Liability: Applying the State-Created Danger Doctrine to Hold Police Officers
Accountable for Responding Inadequately to Domestic-Violence Situations, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1533
(2010); Matthew D. Barrett, Failing to Provide Police Protection: Breeding a Viable and Consistent
"State-Created Danger" Analysis for Establishing Constitutional Violations Under Section 1983, 37
VAL. U. L. REv. 177 (2002); see also, e.g., Peter Bachrach & Marton S. Baratz, Decisions and
Nondecisions: An Analytic Framework, 57 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 632, 641-42 (1963) (identifying
non-decision-making as action that is discernable and subject to analysis).
168. Okin v. Village of Cornwall, 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009).
169. Id. at 430.
170. Id. at 431. The court additionally upheld Okin's claims that the officers' affirmative creation or
enhancement of the risk of violence to her shocked the conscience, given that the "serious and unique
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Other courts similarly have upheld substantive due process and municipal
liability claims when a survivor identified a pattern of conduct, such as a failure
to interview, to investigate, or to take any meaningful steps to determine whether
arrest or further law enforcement action was warranted."' Courts seem
particularly responsive to these claims when the alleged abuser either was a law
enforcement officer, or was friends or otherwise associated with local law
enforcement.' 7 2
But other claims have not been as successful, 73 and the contours of the
doctrine are hard to draw.17 4 For example, it is difficult to reconcile the Okin
risks and concerns of a domestic violence situation are well known and well documented." Id. at 431-32.
The court further upheld her claims of municipal liability based on allegations that the police department
maintained a custom of acquiescing in the officers' misconduct and that the "patterns of misconduct"
suggested training "so inadequate" as to give rise to an inference of deliberate indifference." Id. at 440.
171. See, e.g., Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding affirmative act when
employee provided confidential 911 computer information about ex-wife to perpetrator who went on to
kill the ex-wife, her boyfriend, and her sister); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990)
(remanding for repleading on the theory that the officers affirmatively increased the danger to decedent);
Pearce v. Longo, 766 F. Supp. 2d 367 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (former officer committed suicide and killed wife
even though police officers were well-aware of ongoing abuse by police officer of his wife, assured her
they were "all over this" in response to wife's complaints, failed to discipline or suspend him or to
confiscate his guns or to have his mental condition evaluated); Arteaga v. Town of Waterford, No.
HHDXO7CV5014477, 2010 WL 1611377 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2010) (pattern of law enforcement
failure to interview, investigate and arrest abusive partner that may have encouraged him to commit more
acts of violence).
172. See, e.g., Pearce, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (perpetrator Longo was close friends and former
partners with police chief); Freeman, 911 F.2d at 54-55 (police chief instructed subordinates to ignore
victim's pleas for protection from her husband, who was the chief's friend); cf, Okin, 577 F. 3d at 426,
n.8 (recounting, though not ruling on, plaintiffs' allegations that officers had "significant personal
relationships" with abusive partner and officer's testimony disputing that allegation).
173. See, e.g., Smithers v. Hint, 602 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2010) (no liability when law enforcement
officers arrested girlfriend for trespass, not domestic violence, and released her from custody; no
suggestion that she would be held for period of time and actions may have been seen as reasonable); Culp
v. Rutledge, 343 F. App'x 128 (6th Cir. 2009) (no liability notwithstanding law enforcement assurance
that abusive partner would be arrested, he was not arrested, and subsequently shot the mother of
ex-girlfriend); Burella v. Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2007) (no liability notwithstanding long
history of physical and emotional abuse, numerous reported incidents and purported violation of
protective order; officer's failure to act not an affirmative misuse of authority); Hudson v. Hudson, 475
F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2007) (no liability when law enforcement made no attempt to find husband after wife
called police department alleging violations of protective order and he subsequently killed her and two
friends; inaction not an "affirmative act"); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 994 (1995) (no affirmative act when boyfriend set house on fire and killed plaintiff's
children after police responded to her call for help, assured her that he would be locked up overnight, but
released him). See also, e.g., Estate of Vordermann v. City of Edgerton, No. 09-cv-443-wmc, 2010 WL
3788669 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2010) (plaintiffs arguably may have offered "just enough" facts to
conclude that officers increased the danger to decedent by persuading her to return home, but rejecting
claim because officers' reasons for doing so failed to "shock the conscience"); Mayrides v. Del. Cnty.,
666 F. Supp. 2d 861, 868 (S.D. Ohio 2009) ("hesitant[ly]" dismissing claim that police response to 911
call enhanced the danger to domestic violence caller, noting that "facts of a particular case" are key to
determining the existence of a violation).
174. Accord, Oren, supra note 56, at 51 (arguing that it is difficult to find a "principled difference"
between cases upholding and rejecting state-created danger arguments).
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court's conclusion that law enforcement's comments and actions in response to
repeated calls for assistance constituted affirmative conduct that increased the
survivor's risk of violence with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in
Brooks v. Knapp.'7 5 There, Brenda Hernandez repeatedly called the police after
incidents of threats and protective order violations by her husband, Gilbert
Hernandez, and made complaints that he had a gun and that he threatened to kill
her.176 In what was to be the final incident, the police were called after Mr.
Hernandez physically assaulted her and ripped the phone out of the wall when
she tried to call for help.177 The police arrived and put him in the back of a squad
car, but did not handcuff him; the police allowed him to make phone calls, and,
instead of arresting him, released him.178 A few hours later, he broke into the
house, shot and killed Mrs. Hernandez, and killed himself.179 In the subsequent
section 1983 action by surviving family members, the court did not even analyze
whether the officers' acts of releasing Mr. Hernandez and of providing assurances
to Mrs. Hernandez that additional patrols would be provided constituted
affirmative acts that exposed her to increased risk of danger; instead the court
rejected her substantive due process claim on the basis that the officers took no
affirmative act. 8 0
B. EQUAL PROTECTION
Other cases have invoked equal protection theories to challenge law enforce-
ment approaches to domestic violence claims.' 8 Courts have upheld arguments
that law enforcement policies that treat domestic violence calls less seriously
than non-domestic violence calls could deny equal protection based on sex. 1 82
Evidence such as statistical data showing that non-domestic violence complaints
were more likely to lead to arrest than comparable domestic violence com-
plaints, 18 3 or that police officers were trained to "defuse" domestic violence
175. 221 F. App'x 402 (6th Cir. 2007).
176. Id. at 404-05.
177. Id. at 405.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 407.
181. For discussion of equal protection arguments, see, e.g., Erica Franklin, When Domestic Violence
and Sex-Based Discrimination Collide: Civil Rights Approaches to Combating Domestic Violence and its
Aftermath, 4 DEPAUL J. FOR Soc. JUST. 335 (2011); Niji Jain, Engendering Fairness in Domestic Violence
Arrests: Improving Police Accountability through the Equal Protection Clause, 60 EMORY L.J. 1011
(2011); Susanne M. Browne, Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges to the Inadequate Response
of the Police in Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1295 (1995).
182. See, e.g., Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2000); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712,
716-17 (9th Cir. 1995); Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (3d Cir. 1988), on remand,
731 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988);
Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.
Supp. 1521, 1528-29 (D. Conn. 1984).
183. See, e.g., Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1030; Watson, 857 F.2d at 696.
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situations and to arrest only as a last resort,'8 4 might allow a jury to infer
discriminatory intent. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has gone so far as to
conclude that policies distinguishing domestic violence from non-domestic
violence calls could fail even the rational basis test under the Equal Protection
Clause.' 8 1
The Department of Justice has recognized that inaction in the form of practices
that underserve certain communities also can violate equal protection. 86
Practices such as failing to investigate sexual assault and domestic violence may
constitute such discriminatory practice." 7 Evidence that police downgrade
sexual assault complaints or deem them "unfounded" may reflect gender bias. 8
Data-driven evidence, for example, that a jurisdiction has responded to fewer
forcible rapes than murders, also suggests policing policies and practices that do
not take gender-based crimes such as domestic and sexual violence seriously.' 89
Evidence that a jurisdiction fails to discipline officers who have been accused of
domestic violence also may indicate equal protection violations.1 90
Officers' use of stereotyped comments also could support equal protection
claims.' 9 ' For example, stereotypical assumptions and judgments about sex
crimes and victims of sex crimes, including misguided commentary about
victims' perceived credibility, sexual history, or delay in contacting law
enforcement, may skew law enforcement responses.19 2 Law enforcement may
downgrade sexual assault complaints without conducting a fact-based investiga-
tion.19 3 Investigations may focus on proving an allegation to be false, or on the
victim's trustworthiness, or may otherwise rely on stereotypes, for example, by
asking victims why they did not resist, why they put themselves in certain
184. Id.
185. See Navarro, 72 F.3d at 717.
186. NOPD Investigation, supra note 143, at 32.
187. Id. at 43-51. The Department detailed a range of problems in New Orleans, including inadequate
policies, training and supervision, improper classification of complaints, and inadequate investigations.
Id.
188. Id. at 45. See, e.g., Testimony of Carol E. Tracy, Exec. Dir., Women's Law Project, before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, Rape in the United States: The
Chronic Failure to Report and Investigate Rape Cases (Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://www.
judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-14-10%2OTracy%20Testimony.pdf; CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS,
POLICING AND PROSECUTING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN Los ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY. A COLLABORATIVE
STUDY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE Los ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT, AND THE Los ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (2012), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/237582.pdf.
189. See, e.g., PRPD Investigation, supra note 149, at 57-58.
190. Id. at 58.
191. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1988); (recognizing that
comments such as an officer's response to plaintiff's domestic violence complaint by stating that he "did
not blame plaintiff's husband for hitting her, because of the way she was 'carrying on,"' "strongly
suggest" an intention to treat domestic violence claims less seriously than other assaults as well as an
"animus against abused women").
192. NOPD Investigation, supra note 143, at 43.
193. Id. at 45-46.
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situations, and why they did not immediately disclose the assault to police,
family, or friends. 19 4 Investigators may perpetuate stereotypes, for example, by
asking blaming or leading questions.'" They may rely on characterizations
rather than the victims' own first-hand account, and may rarely question
suspects.19 6 Notwithstanding the prevalence of these practices, equal protection
claims generally have proven to be difficult to sustain, primarily due to the
challenges of establishing discriminatory intent or motive.197
C. (IN)ADEQUACY OF RELIEF
The resulting doctrine under section 1983 charts a patchwork of potential
arguments that set a high threshold for relief. Unless a survivor can prove that an
officer took affirmative acts that increased the risk of private violence or that a
policy intentionally was implemented to discriminate on the basis of gender or
another prohibited ground, section 1983 will not afford relief. The preceding
summary of federal civil rights doctrine highlights both the formal availability of
theories for redress and those theories' practical limitations as remedies for
survivors.' 9 8 For example, the current section 1983 framework would hold law
enforcement accountable for cases in which officers took action that might be
194. Id. at 46.
195. Id. at 47-48. For example, in an interview of a teenager who reported being assaulted by her
moher's boyfriend, a detective recounted that in the victim's explanation of whether she resisted, she
"didn't yell or scream, nor did she try to use her cell phone to call her mom or the police." Id. The
detective noted that "the accused never threatened or implied to have a weapon or cause her physical
harm." Id. at 48. He described the victim and her mother's demeanor as "very nonchalant." Id. In other
cases, investigators may preclude investigations based on erroneous conclusions that forensic evidence
would not be available if not immediately reported. Id. at 49.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1063-64 (1st Cir. 1997); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865,
876-78 (2d Cir. 1994); Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 779-82 (8th Cir. 1994); Brown v.
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1114, 1119 (3d Cir. 1990); McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409,414-15
(5th Cir. 1989); Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1241. The viability of a particular claim
rests on case-specific fact-intensive inquiries. See, e.g., Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299, 306-07
(5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting equal protection argument due to lack of evidence of discriminatory intent and
causation, notwithstanding Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognition of the equal protection theory in
domestic violence cases in Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds
by McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).
198. State remedies also may be available, but may take similarly restrictive approaches. See, e.g.,
Valdez v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.3d 69 (N.Y. 2011) (rejecting domestic violence survivor's negligence
claim against police after her estranged boyfriend shot her after her call to police in which a law
enforcement officer assured her that he would be arrested immediately). Other courts, however, have
recognized that victims may have a remedy for law enforcement officers' willful and wanton violation of
a statutory duty created under a state Domestic Violence Act. See, e.g., Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659
N.E.2d 1322 (111. 1995); see also, e.g., Matthews v. Pickett Cnty., 996 S.W. 2d 162 (Tenn. 1999) (rejecting
"public duty" defense to negligence action because restraining order created "special duty" to protect
plaintiff); Campbell v. Campbell, 682 A.2d 272, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding non-discretionary
duty to enforce restraining order); Donaldson v. Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098, 1103 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (law
enforcement officer has mandatory duty to arrest in domestic violence cases); Nearing v. Weaver, 670
P.2d 137 (Or. 1983) (en banc) (statute's mandatory retraining order directive created "specific duty" for
the "benefit of individuals previously identified by judicial order).
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deemed to encourage private violence, but not in cases of flat inaction; for cases
in which policies could be proved to be intentionally discriminatory, but not for
those that inadvertently discriminate.
We should ask whether this framework encourages meaningful and effective
responses. Some worry that limitations of the current framework will encourage
law enforcement to ignore domestic violence calls, which would produce a return
to the widely critiqued circumstances that led to the adoption of mandatory arrest
policies in the first place.' 99 Others have raised concerns that the framework
encourages survivors and community members to take the law into their own
hands when trained law enforcement officers could respond more effectively.200
Still others argue that, as a form of under-enforcement, law enforcement's failure
appropriately to respond to domestic violence claims casts doubt on the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system.2 0'
The inconsistencies and limitations of the current framework should be
challenged. As Natapoff has argued, a response to the problem of under-
enforcement calls for a different approach to police responsiveness, not simply
for more policing.2 02 Advocacy urging a more responsive role for the state could
bring the United States into greater compliance with international human rights
directives.20 3 Arguments advocating a reimagined state role in addressing the
needs of those who are most vulnerable reflect a similar vision.2 04 One might
consider challenges to the negative rights philosophy reflected in DeShaney v.
Winebago and Castle Rock v. Gonzales as a way to lay a foundation for a more
nuanced and effective floor for state intervention.20 5 Congress could chart an
approach to state accountability more in line with international human rights
standards and could recognize states' positive obligations to hold law enforce-
ment accountable for exposing survivors to danger.2 0 6 It could propose a
199. G. Kristian Miccio, If Not Now, When? Individual and Collective Responsibility for Male
Intimate Violence, 15 WASH. & LEE 1. CIvEt RTs. & Soc. JusT. 405, 424 (2009) (arguing that recent
decisions have eviscerated mandatory law enforcement intervention).
200. Fenton, supra note 7, at 406.
201. Natapoff, supra note 16, at 1775.
202. Id. at 1773.
203. See supra notes 35-37, and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STArE: FAMIEs, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA'S
POLITICAL IDEALS (2010); Martha A. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60
EMORY L.J. 251, 273-75 (2010); Laura Spitz, Theorizing the More Responsive State: Transcending the
National Boundaries of Law, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAw: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND
LEGAL THEORY (Martha A. Fineman ed., 2011).
205. Future scholarship could address how arguments challenging the DeShaney doctrine might be
fashioned.
206. See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, Notes from the Underground: Battered Women, the State, and
Conceptions of Accountability, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 133 (2000) (critiquing the DeShaney Court's
approach to the role of the state in establishing accountability for responding to domestic violence); G.
Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and Conceptions of State
Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111 (2005) (urging frameworks of state accountability for law
enforcement responses to domestic violence); Oren, supra note 56 (arguing that both DeShaney and
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statutory response to Castle Rock confirming that law enforcement officers'
actions, or inaction, may constitute affirmative conduct that increases victims'
vulnerability to violence and is actionable under section 1983.207 Short of that
transformative vision, litigation could challenge, or at least aim to clarify, the
distinction reflected in the state-created danger exception between action and
inaction.208 At a minimum, increased public attention to, and discussion of, the
shortcomings and successes of law enforcement intervention, framed in the
language of human or civil rights, would generate dialog that could inform
productive new initiatives.2 09
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY REIMAGINED
A reimagined civil rights approach would take a fresh look at how civil rights
frameworks could support law enforcement accountability. Current approaches
to police over-enforcement include litigation-based remedies (for example,
through claims under Section 1983), administrative accountability, and commu-
nity-based campaigns. New approaches to under-enforcement similarly could tap
formal mechanisms authorizing administrative accountability as well as commu-
nity-organizing efforts. This section elaborates on forms those approaches might
take. Although these solutions may not eliminate the problem, they can expand
the range of options available to those affected by under-enforcement.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
A reimagined civil rights response might include remedies other than
traditional civil litigation. If law enforcement's under-responsiveness to domestic
and sexual violence claims were to be viewed on the continuum of police
misconduct, a range of remedies would come into view. For example, two federal
statutes authorize Department of Justice investigations of claims that law
enforcement officers and criminal justice agencies discriminate on enumerated
protected grounds,2 10 or engage in a pattern or practice of violating the
Castle Rock are wrong and should be challenged). For additional suggestions for doctrinal reform, see,
e.g., Awoyomi, supra note 167; Barrett, supra note 167; Shtelmakher, supra note 167.
207. In other words, a federal statutory response could codify the approach of the Okin court.
208. See, e.g., Oren, supra note 66. Alternatively, state statutes or constitutions could provide the
substantive foundation for establishing states' obligations to provide a minimum level of security, in
gender violence and other similar claims. See, e.g., Helen Gugel, Remaking the Mold: Pursuing
Failure-to-Protect Claims under State Constitutions via Analogous 'Bivens'Actions, 110 CoLUM. L. REV.
1294 (2010) (urging state constitutional remedies); Kathryn E. Litchman, Punishing the Protectors: The
Illinois Domestic Violence Act Remedy for Victims of Domestic Violence Against Police Misconduct, 38
Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 765 (2007) (urging state legislative remedies).
209. See generally, e.g., Schneider et al., supra note 59, at 115-18 (discussing advocacy strategies).
210. See 42 U.S.C. §3789d (2010) (prohibiting pattern or practice of discrimination on the ground of
race, color, religion, national origin or sex in any program or activity funded by the Office of Justice
Programs). This provision was enacted as part of the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, which
established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. See Act of Dec. 27, 1979, Pub. L. 96-157,
93 Stat. 1167.
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constitution of federal law. 2 1' These laws identify somewhat different prohibi-
tions and procedural requirements,2 12 and both contemplate injunctive relief
rather than compensation.2 13 Nevertheless, they both afford vehicles for investi-
gation and review of law enforcement practices that offer an alternative to private
litigation.2 14
Although both federal statutes most often address cases of racial miscon-
duct,2 15 their statutory scope encompasses cases involving gender-based discrimi-
nation and abuse. 2 16 Recent investigations have found gender-biased police
practices, such as the failure to investigate sexual and domestic violence, and
inadequate policies, procedures, and training with respect to sexual and domestic
violence cases, among identified patterns and practices of police misconduct.2 17
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2010) (authorizing civil action by Attorney General upon reasonable
cause to believe that a program or activity receiving Office of Justice Programs funding violates the
federal constitution or statutory law). This provision was enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
212. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d authorizes Department of Justice investigations and authorizes a
private right of action by an individual after exhaustion of administrative (DOJ) remedies. 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141 is both broader and more limited than § 3789d. It is broader in that it authorizes the Attorney
General to investigate and bring suit to remedy a "pattern or practice of conduct" that "deprives persons
of rights privilege or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States,"
and thus reaches beyond discriminatory conduct. It is narrower in that it does not permit a claim by an
individual, even if she has exhausted her administrative remedies of complaining to the DOJ.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 authorizes a civil action by the Attorney General for "equitable and
declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice." 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) (Westlaw). 42 U.S.C.
§ 3789d contemplates injunctive or other relief "as necessary or appropriate to insure the full enjoyment
of the rights proscribed in this section, including . .. repayment" of the OJP funds, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3789d(c)(3), and authorizes recovery of attorney fees by a prevailing plaintiff in the event a private
person brings a civil action to enforce compliance after exhaustion of her administrative complaint with
DOJ. 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(4)(B) (Westlaw). For a discussion of the Department of Justice's enforcement
practices with respect to these statutes, see, e.g., Civil Rights Div., Conduct of Law Enforcement
Agencies, U.S. DEP'T OF JusT., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/police.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
214. For general discussion of these statutes, and of administrative oversight of law enforcement
accountability, see, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police
Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REv. 93 (2012); Simmons, supra note 14; Kami C.
Simmons, New Governance and the "New Paradigm" ofPolice Accountability: A Democratic Approach
to Police Accountability, 59 CATH. U. L. REv. 373 (2010); Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and
Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004); Samual Walker, The New Paradigm of Police
Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department "Pattern or Practice" Suits in Context, 22 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 3 (2003); Walker & McDonald, supra note 130, at 502-16.
215. See, e.g., Marshall Miller, Note, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 149, 161-64 (1998)
(noting that § 14141 was enacted in response to the police brutality committed against Rodney King and
others); Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling ofAfrican-Americans in the Selective Enforcement
of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. Prrr. L. REV. 721, 732-36 (2004) (discussing use of 42
U.S.C. §§ 3789d and 14141 to redress racial profiling).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 3789d explicitly prohibits sex discrimination among the enumerated types of
prohibited activities; 42 U.S.C. § 14141 prohibits sex discriminatory practices by prohibiting conduct
protected by the "Constitution or laws of the United States," which would include those guaranteeing
equal protection, and those prohibiting sex discrimination.
217. For discussion of these investigations, see supra notes 141-155 and accompanying text.
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At least one investigation led to oversight of domestic violence committed by law
enforcement officers.2 18 These reports demonstrate the potential of viewing
responses to gender-based violence on the police misconduct continuum.
Administrative responses through Department of Justice investigation can
offer a useful alternative to private litigation as a mechanism for complaint,
investigation and oversight.2 19 The administrative approaches created under 42
U.S.C. §§ 14141 and 3789d have several advantages to traditional private
litigation. Individuals can seek investigations regardless of whether they have a
lawyer or can afford court fees. Administrative enforcement therefore addresses
some inherent limits of the private enforcement scheme favored under most
federal civil rights laws. 2 2 0 The approach squarely frames problems of law
enforcement accountability as a civil rights problem, and creates the potential for
a uniform federal floor for accountability. Even though limited investigatory
resources and the relatively high "pattern or practice" threshold for intervention
likely render this a remedy that would be invoked in select cases only, it can be a
valuable tool for institutional reform.2 2 1
On the other hand, the departmental capacity for undertaking investigations
will be constrained by the availability of administrative resources, which may
vary depending on the administration in office.2 22 Since the statutes do not
authorize a direct, private right of action, and since they set a threshold of liability
for patterns or practices of wrongdoing, they may not afford redress in individual
cases of misconduct.22 3 In addition, they do not authorize financial compensa-
tion, which may render them unappealing and inadequate for complainants
seeking compensation for financial losses in addition to changes in policies and
practices.
218. An investigation resulted in a consent decree in United States v. City of Pittsburgh, which, inter
alia, required documentation of all claims or suits in which a police officer is named in a domestic
violence matter. See Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Apr. 16,
1997, at para. 12a, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/pittssa.php.
219. For discussion of the efficacy of 42 U.S.C. § 14141, see, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TAKING
STOCK: REPORT FROM THE 2010 ROUNDTABLE ON THE STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICE
PATTERN OR PRACTICE PROGRAM (42 U.S.C. § 14141) (2011); see also, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting
Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2009) (discussing scholarly
response to 42 U.S.C. § 14141).
220. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PurATE LAWSUITS IN
THE U.S. (2010); cf Johnson, supra note 136 (urging expanded concept of Fair Housing Act's
administrative enforcement scheme).
221. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 219 (discussing promises and limitations of Section 14141, and
proposing strategies for more impactful implementation).
222. For a discussion of this and other critiques, see, e.g., id. at 20-21.
223. Under 42 U.S.C. § 3789d, an individual can bring a private suit, but only after exhausting the
administrative complaint procedure after filing a complaint with the offending program. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3789d(c)(4)(A) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-140 & 112-141).
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Nevertheless, steps can be taken to build on these existing enforcement
mechanisms. For example, federal legislation might confirm that the Department
of Justice's existing civil rights investigatory authority applies to all state
agencies involved in the investigation and prosecution of domestic and sexual
violence. 2 2 4 An administrative guidance might confirm the Department of
Justice's investigatory authority to investigate claims of gender-biased law
enforcement practices.2 25 Expanding the range of available remedies and
publicizing their availability can go a long way toward shifting our popular
understandings and promoting needed redress.
B. COMMUNITY RESPONSE
To some extent, the absence of a widespread call for reform reflects the fact
that public discourse and rhetoric do not frame under-policing of gender violence
as a matter of civil or human rights. It follows that increased public education and
community organizing could support reinvigorated reform. For example, commu-
nity organizer Ejim Dike argues that community members may not know that
United States law currently does not impose a duty on the government to provide
protection from violence perpetrated by private actors.2 26 Campaigns to increase
awareness of the limitations of current accountability schemes could generate
engaged discussion and activism. They could foster new collaborations between
grassroots groups and human rights projects that frame gender violence as a
human rights violation.2 27 As an issue that spans racial and gender justice
concerns, under-policing of gender violence could support new coalitions and
partnerships. 2 2 8 For example, the Lenahan decision has prompted organizing and
activism by battered mothers who lost custody of their children, and has spurred
224. By authorizing Department of Justice investigations into discriminatory or otherwise unconstitu-
tional law enforcement practices, that approach would be similar to the proposals enumerated in the Civil
Rights Restoration Acts of 2001 and 2003, which, inter alia, would authorize civil action by the Attorney
General for equitable relief upon "[r]easonable cause to believe that any State or political subdivision of a
State ... or other person acting on behalf of a State or political subdivision of a State has discriminated on
the basis of gender in the investigation or prosecution of gender-based crimes and that discrimination is
pursuant to a pattern or practice of resistance to investigating or prosecuting gender-based crimes."
Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 394, 108th Cong. (2003); Violence
Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2001, H.R. 429, 107th Cong. (2001).
225. For example, a guidance analogous to the Department of Justice' guidance of the use of race in
law enforcement could elaborate impermissible gender-biased practices. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
Civi. RIGrTs Div., GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAw ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
(2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance-onrace.pdf.
226. See Ejim Dike, Community Organizing, in Schneider, et al., supra note 59 at 117-18.
227. Id. at n.27 (referencing examples including the Center for Women's Global Leadership "16 Days
of Activism" campaign; International Human Rights Day, Dec. 10; International Women's Day, March 8;
periodic reports due to international human rights treaty bodies).
228. See, e.g., WOMEN'S JusT. CTR., http://justicewomen.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012)
(calling for greater law enforcement accountability as a matter of gender equality); NY Bill of Rights, NAT.
DOMESTIC WORKERS ALLIANCE, http://www.domesticworkers.org/ny-bill-of-rights (last visited Oct. 3,
2012) (describing successful campaign to promote legislative reform for domestic workers' working
conditions).
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U.S.-based domestic violence advocacy efforts to incorporate human rights
premises into their advocacy in family court matters. 2 2 9 This type of activism
could generate fresh approaches to law reform as well as policy-based change at
the local level.
New remedies, even if limited in scope, could spur community organizing and
activism demanding accountability from local law enforcement agencies. The
recent DOJ investigations confirming the Department's statutory authority to
investigate instances of systemic under-enforcement of crimes that disproportion-
ately impact women could form the basis for public education or organizing
campaigns urging local speak-outs, public conversations, and advocacy to hold
local officers accountable. The specter of potential federal investigation could
offer a new tool for local activists frustrated by the limited avenues of redress
through traditional litigation. The "civil rights" or "human rights" frame affords a
different lens through which community groups can address longstanding
problems of inequality and discrimination.23 0
Local human rights resolutions affirming that freedom from domestic violence
is a basic human right constitute one such approach. Law school clinics in
Cincinnati, Baltimore and Miami drafted human rights ordinances, each of which
subsequently were adopted by their respective local city councils.23 1 Those
resolutions now can be used to advance public awareness and constitute an
additional tool to support legal and policy-driven advocacy on behalf of survivors
and their families.
V. LIMrrATIONS AND CONCERNS
This proposal to promote mechanisms for advancing law enforcement
accountability may raise several concerns. This section addresses two: the risk
that such efforts will contribute to the existing over-criminalization of domestic
violence, and concerns about the dangers of engaging with the state.
229. Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 13, at 191-92.
230. See, e.g., N.Y. Crry HUM. RTs. INITIATIVE, http://www.nychri.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2012)
(describing local initiatives to enact human rights laws).
231. See, e.g., Resolution Expressing the Board's Intent to Declare that the Freedom from Domestic
Violence is a Fundamental Human Right, Miami-Dade County, Fla., Res. R-644-12 (July 17, 2012),
available at http://www.miamidade.gov/govaction/matter.asp?matter= 121380&file=true&yearFolder=
Y2012; Declaring that freedom from domestic violence is a fundamental human right, Cincinnati, Ohio,
Resolution 47-2011 (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://city-egov.cincinnati-oh.gov/Webtop/ws/councill
public/child/Blob/33497.pdf;jsessionid=29F32575Al42D399B4BDDAA85FC5FBB7?rpp=-10&m=
2&w=doc_no%3D'201101139'; Freedom from Domestic Violence is a Fundamental Human Right,
Baltimore, Md., Resolution 12-0034 (Mar. 19. 2012), available at http://www.baltimorecitycouncil.com/
Council_Joumal/12-03-198th.pdf. See also Schneider, et al., supra note 59, at 119; Memorandum from
Jennifer Cunningham-Minnick et al., Law Students at the Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of Law, To be Free
from Domestic Violence is a Fundamental Human Right (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://bit.ly/
KaBFlW (memorandum supporting Cincinnati Resolution 47-2011).
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A. OVER-CRIMINALIZATION
One issue raised by proposals to promote law enforcement accountability is
the concern that responses would exacerbate the current emphasis on law
enforcement interventions for domestic and sexual violence. As others have
detailed, the extent to which criminal justice interventions have dominated the
United States' legal and policy-based response to domestic and sexual violence
has proved problematic, particularly for undocumented survivors, for those in
communities of color, and for the LGBT community.2 32 Over-incarceration of
people of color and criminal justice policies that disproportionately target
communities of color have led to widespread distrust of law enforcement.2 33
Many will not turn to the criminal justice system for help because of widespread
violence against women of color perpetrated by the state.234 Battered immigrant
women face the additional possibility that seeking help from the criminal justice
system will expose them, or their partners, to the risk of deportation.2 3 5 LGBT
survivors similarly may resist criminal justice interventions because of fears that
law enforcement either will not respond, will arrest and criminalize both parties,
or will respond with homophobic comments that further subject them to abuse.23 6
However, the question of the wisdom of supporting law enforcement
initiatives as a preferred policy response to gender violence is analytically
distinct from the question of whether law enforcement should be accountable
when survivors affirmatively seek intervention.237 Critiques of over-criminaliza-
232. See, e.g., BUMILLER, supra note 91; MOGUL ET AL., supra note 116; JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE
LAW: How THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009); RICHIE, supra note
92; SMITH ET AL., supra note 92; Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence
in a Prison Nation, 37 J. LAW & Pot'Y 13, 33-35 (2011); Beth E. Richie, A Black Feminist Reflection on
the Antiviolence Movement, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS 50 (Natalie J. Sokoloff & Christina
Pratt eds., 2005); Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-essentialist Critique of Mandatory
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
233. See, e.g., RICHIE, supra note 92, at 99-124 (tracing connections between black women, male
violence and increasing criminalization and imprisonment); SMITH ET AL., supra note 92, at 11
(describing, inter alia, the criminal justice system's disproportionate punishment of people of color, and
violence by law enforcement against women of color); see generally, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW (2012) (detailing effects of criminalization of African Americans).
234. Smith et al., supra note 92; see also, e.g., Andrea J. Ritchie, Law Enforcement Violence Against
Women of Color in COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY (2006).
235. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women,
23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 7, 36-37 (2004). For example, the increase in dual arrests leads battered
immigrant women who have been arrested to plead guilty to avoid jail time and reduce the risk that their
children will be removed by child protective services, but exposes them to the possibility of deportation.
Id. at 37. Battered immigrant women may not want to call the police because they may not want their
abuser to be subject to deportation, or because of fear that exposing an abusive partner to the risk of
deportation may trigger further violence. Id.
236. See MOGUL ET AL., supra note 116, at 132-40.
237. Cf, e.g., Fenton, supra note 7, at 392-93 (arguing that police discretion leads to both over and
under enforcement in poor communities and in communities of color); Miccio, supra note 199, 414-15
(describing battered women's movement's dual concerns with under-enforcement in domestic violence
cases and with an aversion to partnering with the state).
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tion should not mitigate the importance of consistent and non-discriminatory
responses when survivors choose to reach out to law enforcement for assis-
tance.2 3 8 Advancing law enforcement accountability when survivors seek
intervention would further, not thwart, efforts to support survivors' agency and
empowerment. 239 Advocating for responsive and non-discriminatory policing is
not a wholesale endorsement of criminal justice based responses. Instead, a call
challenging over- as well as under-policing as misconduct reflects a practical, if
incremental, approach to civil rights reform.
B. ENGAGING WITH THE STATE
An additional concern may rest with the challenges associated with state
intervention. The history of feminists' calls for increased state responsiveness has
been mixed at best. For example, within the context of domestic violence, state
involvement has meant an increase of funding and resources for a wide range of
services. Yet some argue that engagement with the state comes at a high price.
For example, Leigh Goodmark argues that anti-domestic violence advocates
have invested power in the state at the expense of grounding policy in the voices
of survivors.2 4 0 Kristin Bumiller elaborates the complications of relying on the
state for assistance, and argues that well-meaning reforms may even worsen
dependencies.24 1 On the other hand, feminists also propose reforms that would
allocate resources to support a more responsive state.242
These concerns raise significant issues that must be parsed in the context of
particular proposed reforms. Here, the proposal to bolster avenues for checking
misuse of state power would give voice to survivors' experiences, and should not
exacerbate the concerns about state supervision or state-supported dependency
that have been the core of objections to a more robust state response. That said,
charting an appropriate role for state intervention requires a delicate balance, one
that is subject to checks and balances by government and community groups
alike.
CONCLUSION
Framing law enforcement under-responsiveness to gender violence through
the lens of under-enforcement allows a re-imagining of how law and policy might
meaningfully advance the federal interest in law enforcement accountability. At a
minimum, the combined impact of the IACHR's decision in Lenahan v. United
States and the increasing global recognition of the ways gender violence violates
238. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 16, at 1773 (arguing that the problem of underenforcement should
be countered by more or different policing that increases police responsiveness and democratic
sensitivity to all stakeholders in the policing process).
239. Cf GOODMARK, supra note 41, at 118-25.
240. See GOODMARK, supra note 41, at 6.
241. BUMILLER, supra note 91, at 96-98.
242. See, e.g., supra note 204, and accompanying text.
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civil and human rights, suggests that we broadly consider new approaches that
will most meaningfully and effectively deter and end all forms of gender
violence.
This article calls for two shifts in approaches to anti-gender based violence
advocacy. It urges a renewed focus on institutional accountability as a matter of
civil rights, and it argues that cases alleging law enforcement's failure to respond
to domestic or sexual violence calls be treated as cases of police misconduct. As a
practical matter, these shifts would make useful contributions to improving
justice system responses to gender violence. They also would contribute to a new
generation of progressive reform that advances the principles of equality and
liberty for which civil rights long has stood.

